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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nampa Education Association ("NEA"), in its Respondent's Brief, agrees that to have 
standing before this Court, it must have suffered harm. NEA incorrectly finds harm to itself by 
alleging School District violated Idaho Code§§ 33-513 and 33-1271, et seq. 
Further, NEA acknowledges there was no master agreement in place to govern the 
actions of Nampa School District No. 131 ("School District") or NEA. Therefore, there can be 
no standing based upon any breach of a master agreement. 
If this Court finds that NEA is without standing, then it need not decide the other issues 
raised by School District. However, if standing for NEA is determined by this Court, then this 
Court must decide: the issue of mootness, the applicability ofidaho Code § 33-513 to the facts 
and law of this case, and the application of Idaho Code § 33-1271, et seq., with regard to the 
legal issues presented. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. NEA Relies on Case Law that Does Not Support Its Claim of Standing. 
A review of the cases presented to this Court by NEA in its claim of standing in litigation 
between teacher associations and school districts discloses that all had master agreements at the 
heart of the disputes. Standing for the association in each of those cases was based on a harm 
suffered when a school district breached its responsibilities under a master agreement. There is no 
master agreement in this case. 
Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Bd of Trustees of Bear Lake School Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 
443, 776 P.2d 452 (1989), does not provide standing for NEA as it was a claim for breach of a 
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master agreement. The court in Gilmore v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 132 Idaho 257, 
971 P.2d 323 (1999), interpreted a master agreement as to extra-duty pay. Neither case provides 
any legal basis to support NEA's position on standing. 
The parties agree that for NEA to have standing, it must have a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy. NEA relies on Miles v. Idaho Power Company, 116 Idaho 635, 641, 
778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989), in support of its position on standing, but fails to discuss requirements 
for injury to itself. '"Personal stake' has come to be understood to require not only a 'distinct 
palpable injury' ... but also a 'fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury 
and the challenged conduct." Id. at 641. 
NEA has not alleged or presented evidence of any personal stake in the voluntary 
agreements to take furlough days. NEA has not suffered a distinct palpable injury and has no 
standing. 
B. The Declaratory Judgment Act Does Not Provide Standing for NEA. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act does not afford any help to NEA in its quest for standing. 
As provided by case law, Idaho Code § 10-1201 requires harm to be alleged or proven by 
NEA. "The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has 
standing to bring an action in the first place." Martin, et al. v. Camas County ex rel. Bd Com 'rs, 
150 Idaho 508,513,248 P.3d 1243, 1248 (2011). There must be an allegation or documentation of 
an injury in fact and that the relief requested would prevent or redress the injury. The relief 
requested in this case was a finding that the addendurns were unlawful, which does not result in 
harm to NEA. A court's power to "declare rights, status and other legal relations" (Idaho Code§ 10-
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1201) "does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the action in the first 
instance." Schneider v. Howe, et al., 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). 
NEA does not correctly read Glengary-Gamlin Protective Association, Inc. v. Bonner 
County Bd. of Comm., 106 Idaho 84,675 P.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983), when it represents: 
The Court of Appeals determined that the Association satisfied the three-part 
Hunt test, specifically finding that the Association did not seek damages, but only 
judicial review and injunctive relief, and therefore there was no required proof of 
injury claimed by the individual members of the Association. 
Id. at 89, 675 P.2d 349; Respondent's Brief, p. 6. The Hunt test does not eliminate harm, either 
to members of the association or the association itself, to find associational standing. Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434 (1977). The Hunt 
test can be summarized as follows: 
[W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of 
its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's 
purpose; and ( c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 
Id. at 343. In Hunt, the U.S. Supreme Court found harm to the apple growers themselves; the 
Apple Advertising Commission's purpose was to protect and enhance the market for Washington 
apples and, thus, was harmed. Therefore, the request for declaratory judgment did not require 
individualized proof of harm for each grower. 
In Glengary, the Court of Appeals determined that individual members of the association 
had been harmed (had "standing to sue in their own right"). Id. at 88. It also determined that the 
association had an interest in protecting the open space from encroachment upon its members' 
property, and the individual members were not required to participate. When seeking a 
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declaratory judgment, the association need not particularize proof of injury, but it is not relieved 
of alleging or presenting evidence of generalized harm either to itself or to its members. 
Such is not the case before the Court. There is no evidence of harm to either NEA's 
members or to the association. Without harm, NEA has no standing. 
C. Idaho Code § 33-513 Was Not Violated by School District and Does Not Provide 
Standing for NEA. 
NEA acknowledges that it had no master agreement with School District but attempts to 
bootstrap Idaho Code § 33-513 into a legal basis for standing. It must be remembered that 
standard teacher contracts were issued by School District as a result of not reaching agreement 
with NEA. Thereafter, negotiations continued and were continuing into December, 2012, when 
School District realized the dire financial straits it was facing. 
Simply put, the voluntary addendums were not contracts of employment. They dealt only 
with voluntary furlough days. It was not within the jurisdiction of the district court, nor is it the 
responsibility of this Court, to interfere with a voluntary act by a teacher to aid that teacher's 
employer to meet significant cash-flow problems. These are matters of discretion with a local 
board of trustees, school district, and its teachers. NEA has cited no case law that stands for the 
proposition that Idaho Code§ 33-513 is subject to negotiations nor that these addendums signed 
voluntarily by teachers in any way violated§ 33-513. 
NEA relies on Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91, 131 Idaho 827,965 P.2d 187 
(1998), to support its claim for standing under Idaho Code § 33-513. The court in Rhoades 
determined that the teacher's acknowledgment at the bottom of a letter that her contract was for 
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one year only was invalid and "ineffective to change the rights the teacher had under the statute 
and the master contract." Id. at 830. The "employment letter" did not comply with the 
requirements of Idaho Code § 33-513 for an employment contract; however, this teacher also 
signed a standard teacher contract as well as the "employment letter." This case, too, involves a 
master agreement. The facts of Rhoades are not the facts before this Court. 
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 227, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009), 
provides no help to NEA in its claim that School District violated Idaho Code § 33-513. 
Wernecke dealt with interpretation of an unambiguous statute that prevented an employee from 
waiving her rights to compensation under the workmen's compensation act. The statute clearly 
said that such a waiver would be invalid. There is nothing illegal about a teacher volunteering 
furlough days. How can NEA assume that it has the responsibility to enforce Idaho Code § 33-
513? This statute requires school districts and their board of trustees to enter into employment 
contracts with teachers on a form approved by the State Superintendent of Education. The only 
way NEA would have any concern with Idaho Code § 33-513 on behalf of its members would be 
those matters agreed upon in the negotiations process and memorialized in a master agreement, 
such as compensation, additional terms or conditions of probation, or expanded due process 
rights. Such is not the case before the court. 
There is no legal basis to support NEA's position that it has the authority to enforce Idaho 
Code§ 33-513. Even assuming the addendums were contrary to Idaho Code§ 33-513, there is 
still no harm to NEA. The addendums were not contracts for employment as contemplated in Idaho 
Code§ 33-513, but were agreements to allow teachers to contribute furlough days. 
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NEA cannot rely on Idaho Code§ 33-513 to find harm. This Court should find no harm to 
NEA by teachers volunteering to take furlough days. NEA has no standing to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the Court under Idaho Code§ 33-513. 
D. The Issue of Voluntary Addendums is Moot as the Voluntary Addendums had been 
Performed. 
In determining whether or not a case is moot, the court reviews to determine whether the 
"action for declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted, would have no effect 
either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief 
based on the judgment and no other relief is sought in the action." Bettwieser v. New York 
Irrigation District, et al., 154 Idaho 317, 326, 297 P.3d 1134, 1143 (2013) (quoting Wylie v. 
Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31,253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011)). 
Consider the facts of this case: The voluntary addendums were signed by teachers during 
December, 2012; the furlough days had been taken and completed prior to the district court's 
hearing on the motion. (R., 102.) What effect does the district court's finding of illegal 
employment contract under Idaho Code § 33-513 have on NEA? None. The teachers 
volunteered, and NEA cannot obtain further relief on their behalf. NEA asked for no other relief 
in its pleadings or affidavit. 
This action was and is moot. 
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E. School District Understood Its Responsibilities under Idaho Code§ 33-1271, et seq., 
and Did Not Violate the Statute. 
NEA misinterprets the application of Idaho Code § 33-1271 "as it existed in the fall of 
2012." Respondent's Brief, p. 21. 
Let's be clear in understanding the statute that sets out the responsibilities for negotiations 
under Idaho Code § 33-1271. During the First Regular Session of the 61 st Legislature (2011 ), Senate 
Bill No. 1108 was adopted altering the relationships of school districts and teacher associations. 
Idaho Code§ 33-1271 was amended to narrow the subject matter of negotiation to compensation as 
defined by statute. No longer would school districts and teacher associations "negotiate ... in good 
faith on those matters specified in any such negotiations agreement ... " Id 
These amendments came to be known as the "Luna Laws," and were rejected by the voters 
in a Referendum Election held November 6, 2012. The Governor proclaimed Proposition One 
(Senate Bill No. 1108) repealed on November 21, 2012. The result of the Referendum Election and 
subsequent Proclamation reinstated the laws as they existed prior to Senate Bill 1108, and school 
districts were again required to negotiate those matters agreed upon by schoo 1 districts and 
associations in a master agreement - not just compensation. 
In the negotiations governed by the Luna Laws, School District and NEA could not agree on 
compensation. As a result of the impasse, School District set compensation based on its last offer 
made at the negotiations table. Negotiations continued in an attempt to reach an agreement 
acceptable to both School District and NEA that would settle the compensation issues. 
At the time of the signing of the addendum contracts which are at issue in this case, the 
Luna Laws had been repealed, and the previous law had been reinstated. Negotiations were then 
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governed by Idaho Code § 33-1271, et seq. (the previous statute), which required teacher 
associations and school districts to enter into negotiations to agree on items to be negotiated 
(master agreement). In December 2012, there was no master agreement existing between School 
District and NEA, but negotiations were continuing. 
The only statute that would give rise to a legal right and standing on behalf ofNEA is Idaho 
Code § 33-1271, which requires school districts and teacher associations to negotiate a labor 
agreement for the benefit of both parties. Idaho Code § 33-1271 does not create a legal right for the 
benefit of NEA, except as it may apply to the negotiated items under a master agreement. Without a 
negotiated agreement as provided in Idaho Code § 33-1271, NEA would have no standing to ask for 
this Court's jurisdiction. 
Certainly, NEA has statutory rights provided by Idaho Code § 33-1271, et seq. NEA 
received its benefits under Idaho Code § 33-1271, et seq., by the continuing efforts of School 
District to negotiate a satisfactory master contract with teachers. 
School District has not ignored statutory requirements in this matter and did not violate 
Idaho Code§ 33-1271, et seq. Teachers volunteering furlough days were not subject to negotiations 
with NEA. There was no master agreement between NEA and School District. 
III. CONCLUSION 
NEA lacks standing. The voluntary agreements to take furlough days are not subject to 
Idaho Code§ 33-513. Because School District and NEA had no master agreement at the time of the 
use of the voluntary addendums, School District was not required to negotiate those addendums 
with NEA under Idaho Code§ 33-1271, et seq. 
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The decision granting summary judgment for NEA must be reversed. The district court 
should be instructed to enter summary judgment for School District. 
DATED this 9th day of May, 2014. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
B y: __ --,!--J 
Wil1iam F. Yost 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
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